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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JERRICK J. ENGLER,
Defendant-Appellant.

NOS. 46278 & 46279
Ada County Case Nos.
CR01-2018-15605 &
CR01-2018-22016

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Engler failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion when it
sentenced him to concurrent sentences totaling 14 years with three years determinate upon Engler’s
convictions for two counts of grand theft, one count of burglary, and one count of aggravated
assault?
ARGUMENT
Engler Has Failed Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Jerrick Engler went to an Albertsons store, snatched a shopper’s purse from her cart, and

used her credit card twice that same day. (PSI, p. 4.) About a year later, Engler went to a Fred
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Meyer store, snatched a shopper’s purse form her cart, and, when a citizen tried to stop him, he
both punched and pulled a knife and threatened the man. (PSI, p. 3.) Engler was arrested in the
course of the second offense, leading to police also solving the first offense. (PSI, pp. 3-4.) The
first victim reported an initial loss of about $1,845.00, and the second victim reported a loss of
$2,987.38. (PSI, pp. 3-5.)
For the 2017 incident the state charged Engler with six counts of grand theft and two counts
of burglary. (R., pp. 98-100.) For the 2018 incident the state charged Engler with two counts of
grand theft, aggravated assault, with a deadly weapon enhancement, and battery. (R., pp. 30-31,
39-40.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Engler pled guilty to two counts of grand theft, aggravated
assault, and burglary, and the state dismissed the remaining charges. (R., pp. 41-52, 102-11; 6/6/18
Tr., p. 9, L. 14 – p. 12, L. 6; 5/31/18 Tr., p. 5, L. 12 – p. 6, L. 13.) The state agreed to recommend
concurrent sentences of 10 years with three years determinate for the burglary, five years with
three years determinate for the aggravated assault, ten years with three years determinate for one
grand theft, and 14 years with three years determinate for the other grand theft. (R., pp. 51, 110;
6/6/18 Tr., p. 11, Ls. 14-18; 5/31/18 Tr., p. 5, L. 22 – p. 6, L. 3.) The district court imposed
concurrent sentences of 10 years with three years determinate for the burglary, five years with
three years determinate for the aggravated assault, ten years with three years determinate for one
grand theft, and 14 years with three years determinate for the other grand theft. (R, pp. 60-62,
121-23.)
Engler argues the district court abused its discretion asserting the court “failed to give
proper weight and consideration to the mitigating factors” in the case. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 46.) Engler’s hope that the court would have given more weight to factors he considers mitigating
does not show an abuse of discretion.
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B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
159 P.3d 838 (2007)). It is presumed that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant’s
probable term of confinement. Id. (citing State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it
is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing
State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).
When considering whether the sentence was an abuse of discretion, “this Court
considers: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion
and consistently with the legal standards applicable; and (3) whether the trial court
reached its decision by an exercise of reason.”
State v. Fisher, 162 Idaho 465, 398 P.3d 839, 842 (2017) (quoting State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828,
834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011)).

C.

Engler Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish

that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive. State v. Farwell, 144
Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). In determining whether the appellant met this burden,
the court considers the entire sentence but, because the decision to release the defendant on parole
is exclusively the province of the executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be
the period of actual incarceration. State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017)
(citing Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391). To establish that the sentence was excessive,
the appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was
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appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation,
and retribution. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. A sentence is reasonable “‘if it appears
necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of
the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.’” Bailey, 161 Idaho at 895–96, 392
P.3d at 1236–37 (quoting State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015)).
In imposing sentences, the district court applied the relevant legal standards. (8/2/18 Tr.,
p. 42, Ls. 1-23.) The district court noted that Engler had a prior felony conviction, for which he
served a rider, was released on probation, and then violated his probation “within one month.”
(8/2/18 Tr., p. 44, Ls. 13-22.) He then violated the terms of his release and absconded, was arrested
again, and given a second rider. (8/2/18 Tr., p. 44, L. 22 – p. 45, L. 3.) The district court
determined that Engler “had been an IV drug user, stealing purses from little old ladies and
burglarizing cars and perhaps homes [and] selling drugs to support his addiction.” (8/2/18 Tr., p.
45, Ls. 4-8.) The district court also noted that Engler had been subject to jail discipline for
“assaultive behavior; having threatened to kill a deputy and his family.” (8/2/18 Tr., p. 45, Ls. 1416.)
The district court also considered mitigation. Specifically, that Engler obtained his GED,
“admits that he needs substance abuse treatment,” and “has significant mental illness issues.”
(8/2/18 Tr., p. 45, L. 17 – p. 46, L. 7.) However, Engler still posed a high risk of recidivism, and
the court stated it did not believe that more programming would do any good. (8/2/18 Tr., p. 46,
Ls. 8-24.) The court therefore concluded that the sentences were necessary to protect the
community. (8/2/18 Tr., p. 47, Ls. 1-19.) Engler does not challenge the district court’s findings,
and those findings support the reasonableness of the sentence imposed.
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On appeal Engler argues the district court “failed to give proper weight and consideration
to the mitigating factors.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 4.) His invitation to simply re-weigh the evidence
shows no abuse of discretion. The district court’s view that cumulative sentences of 14 years with
three years determinate on the four felonies before it were necessary to protect the community
from Engler’s ongoing and repeated criminal activities is reasonable.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 7th day of March, 2019.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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